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ABSTRACT
Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences
in the voluntary provision of public goods.
such preferences have been proposed.

A number of competing models of

We provide evidence for one model of

behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional cooperation).
Consistent with previous research, we find that participants in the voluntary
contribution mechanism attempt to match the contributions of others in their
group. We also examine participants in a related game with different equilibria,
the weakest-link mechanism.

Here, in contrast, participa nts contribute so as

to match the minimum contribution of others in their group.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent spate of theories has emerged to explain pro-social preferences
as observed in experiments and in real life (see Sobel, 2001 for an outstanding
review). This paper focuses on one category of these preferences—reciprocal or
matching preferences. We present experimental results testing the existence
and forms of these preferences from two public goods environments, the wellknown linear public goods game (Voluntary Contribution Mechanism or VCM)
and the relatively under-studied weakest link mechanism (WLM).
In the VCM, the amount of public good produced depends on the total of
individual

contributions.

Both

theoretically

mechanism generates relatively low efficiency.

and

experimentally,

this

In the WLM, the amount of

public good produced depends on the minimum of all contributions.1 It gives rise
to multiple equilibria, one of which is perfectly efficient. Experimentally, the
WLM promotes efficiency in sequential environments (as in Camerer, Weber and
Knez, 2003), but the results are far less solid in simultaneous settings (van
Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1991).
Note that whereas the VCM has a unique, dominant strategy equilibrium,
WLM has a continuum of pure strategy, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria (when
the action space is continuous, and has a multiplicity of equilibria when it is
discrete). In this paper we examine the decision-making processes in the two
institutions.

First, we find deviations from equilibrium predictions in both

institutions. Second, we find evidence for reciprocity (or matching) as an
explanation for that deviation in both institutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the two
games

and

their

experimental

implementation.

Section

3

reports

the

experimental results and Section 4 concludes.

The WLM was introduced by Hirshleifer (1983). Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) conceptualize the
WLM as a kind of veto power over the extent of collective achievement and it has been proposed as
a useful approach to real life coordination problems, from disasters (like floods) to assembly lines.
1

II. THE EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
II.1. The voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM)
In economic experiments, the most common public goods institution is the
VCM (see Ledyard, 1995 or Keser, 2002 for a review). In our experiment, N=4
subjects are endowed with ei=50 Cents and are asked to simultaneously and
privately allocate this endowment between a public and a private account. The
payoff of each individual i is determined by the sum of his allocation to the
private account and half of the group’s total allocation to the public account. In
the stage game, player i has a dominant strategy to free ride for any given
allocation of her three partners. This game is typically repeated finitely many
times, leading to a Nash equilibrium outcome of full free-riding.

Yet, this

outcome is socially inefficient.

II.2. The weakest link mechanism (WLM)
The setting in the WLM is the same; groups of size four, and each
individual has 50 cents to allocate between the two accounts. However, in the
WLM, participants earn the sum of their allocations to the private account and
twice the group’s minimum allocation to the public account. In the stage game,
there are multiple Nash equilibria which coincide with the set of all symmetric
strategy profiles. Since participants are limited to allocate in whole pennies,
and each has 50 cents to allocate, there are fifty-one symmetric, Pareto-ranked
equilibria.2 Complete allocation of all endowments to the public account is the
Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Any unit allocated to the public account in excess
of the minimum is socially inefficient.

II.3. The experimental procedure
In this paper we report the results of computerized experiments, which
replicate closely the environment, particularly the information and payoff

2In

the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the zero contribution equilibrium is risk dominant
while the one in which every player contributes his entire endowment is Pareto-dominant.

structure, of Croson’s (2000) VCM with individual information.3 The experiments
involved 24 economics undergraduates in each treatment, organized into groups
of four from a room of twelve. None of the participants had previously
participated in a public goods experiment.
The experiments entailed ten periods of the VCM (or the WLM), with
another ten-period surprise restart game.4 Participants were randomly chosen
to form groups of four in the first period and remained together throughout both
the original and the restart game. Instructions were written in neutral
language, referring to allocations of tokens rather than contributions. Before
the experiment, participants completed a quiz to ensure that they understood
the payoffs involved in the experiment, and there was a post-experimental
survey to elicit participants’ thoughts about the experience. Instructions, quiz
and surveys are available from the authors.
After each round, participants were told the individual contributions of
the other three members of their group in increasing order of contribution;
individual contributions were not identified with their contributor such that it
was

impossible

to

trace

individual

contributions

(as

in

Croson

2000).

Additionally, subjects were informed about their own earnings both in total and
subdivided by private and public accounts. Average earnings of a subject were
€10.43 in the WLM experiments, and €13.06 in the VCM. Experiments took less
than an hour to run.

III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
III.1. Average Contributions
Figure 1 shows the average contributions to the public good in each of the two
environments over the 20 rounds.

3Urs

Fischbacher’s z-tree was used for the computer programme.

(Figure 1 around here)

Replicating previous studies, we find behavior that is significantly
different than that predicted by equilibrium analysis. Allocations to the public
good in the VCM are significantly different than zero, starting at around 40% of
endowment and then declining over the length of the game. Allocations in the
WLM are also not at equilibrium; in 118 out of the 120 periods (20 pe riods for
each group times six groups), the individuals in the groups allocated different
amounts to the public good.
We also observe contributions decreasing over the ten-periods in the
game,

consistent

with

previous

experiments.

A

regression

of

group

contributions on period number and including an indicator variable for each
group and for the restart game produces a significantly negative coefficient for
both the VCM
(β = -6.381, p=.0000) and the WLM (β = -3.594, p=.0000).
Finally, these data replicate the restart effect, observed by Andreoni (1988)
and Croson (1996) in VCM experiments. We observe a restart effect in both
environments. If we treat each group of four as an independent observation, a
Wilcoxon test compares contributions in round 10 [the last round of the original
game] and round 11 (the first round of the restart game). These differences are
significant for the VCM, p=.028 and for the WLM, p=.046. Thus, we conclude
that participants significantly increase their contributions when the game
restarts.

III.2. Conditional cooperation
But the focus of our paper is on identifying the decision rules in these
environments.

A number of competing models have been proposed to explain

results like those found above. One set of those models involve reciprocity (also

4The

restart technique has been investigated in repeated public goods experiments (see, e.g.,
Andreoni (1988), Croson (1996, 2002), Andreoni and Croson [forthcoming] provide a review).

called matching, also called conditional cooperation).5

In these models,

participants try to match the allocations of their counterparts. Thus if others
contribute to the public good you want to contribute, while if others free-ride
you want to keep your endowment for your private consumption.
We follow Croson (1998) in analyzing the allocations to test this
explanation. The regressions are run separately for the original game and the
restart game.

The dependent measure is individual i’s contribution to the

public good in period t. Independent variables include the period t, indicator
variables for each individual and, of most interest, a measure of what an
individual’s counterparts did last period.
For the VCM, we use the average allocation to the public good of the other
three members of your group in the previous period as this measure. Croson
(1998) showed that this average is salient to the participants and related to
their own allocations.

For the WLM we use the minimum allocation to the

public good of the other three members in your group in the previous period as
this measure. Note that this is not necessarily the amount of the public good
that is provided (the participant’s own allocation may have been less than those
of his three counterparts). But we believe that this measure is salient to the
participants in the WLM. 6

The regressions are run using random effects

regression.7 Thus the equations are:
Model VCM: cont it = β0 + β1 AverCont− it −1 + β2 t + αi + εit

5See,

e.g., Sugden (1984), Andreoni (1995), Palfrey and Prisbey (1997), Croson (1998), Sonnemans et
al. (1999), Fischbacher et al. (2001), Keser and van Winden (2000), and Brandts and Schram (2001).
6We

have also run a number of additional specifications including using the middle of the other
three contributions instead of the average, including the min and the max in the VCM regression,
and the average, the middle and the max in the WLM regressions. All have similar results as those
described here: individuals’ contributions are positively related to the previous contributions of
others, and support our contention that in the VCM participants focus on the average contributions
and in the WLM participants focus on the minimum contribution.
approach has been used, for instance, in Croson (1998). The random variables α ki of the model
account for idiosyncratic behavior and are uncorrelated to the white noise error terms εkit for each
subject i and in period t. For further reading see Greene (2000).
7This

Model WL:

cont it = β0 + β1 MinCont −it −1 + β2 t + αi + εit

∀i = 1, 2,..., 24 and ∀t = {2,3,..,10}

where contit-1 is i‘s lagged contribution, [AverCont-it-1] denotes the lagged average
contributions of i‘s partners in the previous period, and [MinCont-it-1) denotes the
lagged minimum contribution of i’s partners, t is the period number and αi are
the individual indicator variables.. The results are presented in Table 1.

(Table 1 around here)

As can be seen in Table 1, the coefficients on the measure of others’
allocations are positive and significant in both environments and for both the
original and the restart game. This lends support to the reciprocity or matching
explanations suggested to explain our results.
We can also do this analysis at the individual level. For each individual,
we calculate the correlation between their allocations to the public good and
their counterparts’ lagged measure (average or minimum) over the 20 periods.
Of the 48 individuals in our experiment, 45 of them have positive correlations
between their own allocations to the public good and the appropriate measure of
their counterparts’ allocations. This is significantly different than what would
have occurred by chance; a binomial test of the null hypotheses that half these
correlations are positive and half are negative is soundly rejected (p<.0001).

IV. CONCLUSIONS
Our data replicate previous results from the voluntary contribution
mechanism, and point out similarities between the patterns of allocations to the
public good there and in the weakest link mechanism. In both games, initial
allocations average around 40%, decline over the length of the game, and
restart significantly when the game is restarted.
ever observed.

Equilibrium play is hardly

We provide evidence for one model behavior in these games, reciprocity
(or matching, or conditional cooperation).

Consistent with Croson (1998), we

find that participants in the VCM attempt to match the contributions of others
in their group.

Subjects in the WLM, in contrast, attempt to match the

minimum contribution of others in their group.
This evidence suggests some directions that theories developing to
explain cooperative behavior like that observed here might take. Focusing on
the impact of social comparisons, the other players’ actions and individuals’
desires to conform to them are likely to be useful paths to follow.
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Figure 1: Average Allocations to the Public Good
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Table 1: Random Effects Regression Results (SE)
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
Original

Restart

Constant

15.113**

15.508**

Avg Contt-1

0.402**

Period

Weakest Link Mechanism
Original

Restart

Constant

9.873**

10.665**

0.415**

Min Contt-1

0.478**

0.225**

-1.062**

-1.319**

Period

-0.350^

-0.303**

Individual
Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2

0.6339

0.5299

0.4496

0.8667

^ p < .10

(3.330)
(0.118)
(0.283)

(4.084)
(0.150)
(0.331)

R2

(1.737)
(0.102)
(0.209)

(0.758)
(0.070)

(0.074)

* p < .05
** p < .01

